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One of the nice things about the OSSA conferences is that every two years I get a chance
to comment on a paper about pragma-dialectics; this helps me to keep up with recent
developments of the theory. I have learned a lot from studying Mohammed’s paper. I find
her essay intriguing and stimulating and given her starting points, I think she develops a
very interesting analysis of what she calls inconsistency retorts, a kind of tu quoque
challenge to a standpoint. Let me see whether I can briefly review her argument. Then I
will suggest some questions to begin our discussion of her paper.
The tu quoque fallacy (you too) consists in “pointing out an inconsistency
between the other party’s ideas and deeds in the past and/or present” (ACF, p. 212). In
this paper Mohammed uses the expression “accusation of inconsistency retort” as neutral
and tu quoque to denote a fallacious use of an inconsistency retort.
The pragma-dialectical method for resolving differences of opinions has two
aspects to it: (1) the resolution of differences of opinion by critical testing of standpoints,
and (2) strategic manoeuvring. Although the concept of ‘critical testing’ is not explained
in the presentation to-day, I believe what is meant is that a standpoint is critically tested
only if it follows a specified dialectical procedure such as that recommended by the
Critical Discussion model. In contrast, strategic manoeuvring allows that it is not
unreasonable to attempt ‘to win’ an argumentative discussion by selecting certain moves
over others in a critical discussion, provided one doesn’t run afoul of the requirements of
the dialectical procedure.
In part, the dialectical procedure consists in viewing a critical discussion as
having four stages. At the confrontation stage the nature of the disagreement that
constitutes the difference of opinion is identified (it includes neither the giving of
arguments nor the critical reactions to arguments). In the opening stage the ground rules
for the discussion, as well as the starting points, are agreed upon. There must be common
starting points, shared standards of good arguments, and a decision procedure for
determining the outcome of the argumentation. It is at the argumentation stage where the
arguments for a standpoint and doubt against it are made. The defender of the standpoint
makes arguments, attempting to overcome his antagonist’s doubts; the antagonist holds
on to her doubt unless the arguments she hears make it reasonable for her to give them
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up. The concluding stage has to do with deciding what was achieved by the discussion:
was the standpoint successfully defended, or does doubt about it still prevail? Only if the
arguers can agree on these questions, has the difference of opinion been resolved.
In an ideal critical discussion the arguers pursue their disagreement sequentially
through the four stages—or, at least, they ideally pursue the disagreement as far as they
need to in order to eliminate the disagreement.
What is remarkable (worthy of remark) about the PD analysis is that it takes
inconsistency retorts to be moves made at the confrontation stage of argumentative
discussions: even before the rules for the argumentation stage have been agreed upon,
and hence some distance in advance of the argumentation stage. (Perhaps that is why we
never hear about tu quoque arguments in this essay.)
The kinds of disagreements that PD recognizes: Limiting ourselves to simple
disputes—those involving just one standpoint— we have non-mixed disputes, formally
expressed as <+/p, ?(+/p)> and mixed disputes, <+/p, −/p>. Mixed disputes are to be
broken down into two non-mixed disputes—<+/p, ?(+/p)> and <−/p, ?(−/p)>—and,
ideally, dealt with one at a time.
The present paper also introduces a third kind of dispute, what Dima Mohammed
calls a no dispute. I am not able to find a definition of this kind of dispute in my books. 1
“For a dispute to arise at all” according to the 1992 book, “it is necessary that there be
doubt concerning a standpoint” (p. 16). However, according to Mohammed, a
disagreement eliminated is a no dispute, a confrontation that turns out to involve no
difference of opinion, and no doubt. This is one of the three kinds of disputes. Such a nodispute dispute may be represented like this:
[<+/p, +/p> < ש−/p, −/p> (?< ש+/p), ?(+/p)> (?< ש−/p), ?(−/p)>]
Here are some examples of non-mixed disputes; doubt is expressed by the second
speaker in each case through the use of an accusation of inconsistency (an inconsistency
retort):
Father to daughter:
Daughter to father:

Don’t smoke! [standpoint]
(not-A) You used to smoke dad & (A) you say one
shouldn’t smoke [inconsistency retort]

Critic to sportsman:
Sportsman to critic:

You shouldn’t kill animals for sport (pleasure) [standpoint]
(not-A) You take pleasure from eating meat & (A) you say
one shouldn’t kill animals for pleasure [inconsistency
retort]

Cameron to Brown:

“Borrowing should not have been allowed” entailed by

1

Mohammed refers us to Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies, pp. 16 - 22, but I did not find ‘no
dispute’ as a type of dispute discussed there.
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Brown to Cameron:

“Government policies contribute to the recession”
[standpoint]
You are committed to the proposition that borrowing had to
be allowed (not-A) & you say that borrowing should not
have been allowed (A) [inconsistency retort]

In each of these cases, according to Mohammed, the inconsistency retorts may be
understood as attempts by the second speaker to have the first speaker withdraw his
standpoint. Imagine the following sequence of moves.
1. Cameron
2. Brown
3. Cameron

+/p
?(+/p) [Lines 1 and 2 constitute a non-mixed dispute]
?(+/p) [Lines 2 and 3 constitute a no-dispute dispute]

Let us next review the concept of strategic manoeuvring. In general, strategic
manoeuvring is the managing of a process to make it turn out as desired. For rhetoric it
might be this:
(SM) R = Strategic manoeuvring is when a speaker designs his communication in
view of his knowledge of the audience in such a way that it is most
likely to bring about the response in the audience he intends.
The pragma-dialectical adaptation of strategic manoeuvring is as follows:
(SM) PD = Strategic manoeuvring is the attempts by a discussant to steer a
discussion towards the outcome that is most favourable to her. 2
There can be a tension between, on the one hand, an arguer’s desire ‘to win’ and her
subsequent engagement in strategic manoeuvring and, on the other hand, her obligation
to be dialectical.
In a word, the kind of argumentative phenomenon Mohammed is dealing with is
that in which one speaker has a standpoint, and the second speaker expresses doubt about
that standpoint via an inconsistency retort. That will be a non-mixed dispute in which the
first speaker would have the obligation of defending his standpoint. If the first speaker
wants to avoid this obligation (and the possibility of having to withdraw his standpoint),
then he may strategically manoeuvre to change the definition of the dispute form a nonmixed one to a no-dispute dispute.
Strategic manoeuvring, PD-style, can be reasonable, thinks Mohammed if the
attempt contributes to the establishment of the type of difference of opinion as a nodispute dispute without preventing any other defining of the difference of opinion (p. 6);
2

Sometimes Mohammed writes that ‘strategic manoeuvring’ refers to “attempts to reasonably steer” (p. 4),
and sometimes she writes “a reasonable case of strategic manoeuvring” (p. 5). The issue here is whether
‘reasonable’ should be considered as part of the df of SM, or whether we would say that there a reasonable
cases of SM, and non-reasonable cases of SM as well.
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that is, without preventing the defining of the difference in some other way.
Accordingly, Mohammed introduces the the Freedom Requirement:
A
dialectically reasonable accusation of inconsistency (A and not-A) at turn n must not
preclude the possibility that the expressed opinion (A) is maintained at turn n+1.
Perhaps the justification of the freedom requirement is the first PD rule, the freedom rule:
Discussants must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or casting doubt on
standpoints.
The discussant with standpoint A, who engages in strategic manoeuvring at the
confrontation stage by use of an inconsistency retort, in order to define the disagreement
as a non-dispute dispute, attempts to get her interlocutor to withdraw that part of the
inconsistency that is inconsistent with A. In our case study, like this:
Cameron: “Borrowing should not have been allowed” (A) entailed by
“Government policies contribute to the recession” [standpoint]
Brown: You, Cameron, say both that borrowing had to be allowed (not-A) & that
borrowing should not have been allowed (A) [inconsistency retort]
Brown: A commitment to not allowing borrowing is presented as a commitment
that would deprive families and business of real help [strategic
manoeuvring]
Cameron: OK, withdraw commitment to not allowing borrowing
Cameron: OK, then withdraw standpoint that Government policies contribute to
the recession.
Result: No-dispute dispute.
Mohammed analysis is that Brown transgresses the Freedom Requirement when he
associates Cameron’s standpoint that borrowing should not have been allowed with an
insensitivity to people’s problems. That association somehow makes Cameron’s choice
of how to define the difference of opinion unfree. “An alleged inconsistency retort derails
into the tu quoque fallacy,” writes Mohammed, because “an alleged inconsistency in
one’s position is misused to violate one’s freedom to adopt a certain point of view” 3 (p.
9). Thus the effect of the Freedom Requirement is to restrict the kind of strategic
manoeuvring that is reasonable.
Questions
1) How could Brown have manoeuvred to a no-dispute dispute without violating the
Freedom Requirement? Some different examples of this would be helpful.
2) What is the ‘representing’ relation in representing commitment C as commitment D?
3) What if we reconstruct Brown’s manoeuvring as follows?
(1) If borrowing is not allowed then that will deprive families and business of real
3

Does it make any difference if we take out the word “alleged”?
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help
(2) It would be impolitic of Mr Cameron to be seen as being in favour of
depriving families and businesses of real help
(3) Surely, Mr Cameron does not want to deprive families and businesses of real
help
(4) Hence, Mr Cameron should withdraw his implicit claim that borrowing should
not have been allowed
(5) Hence, Cameron must withdraw his standpoint that government policies
contribute to the recession.
(6) So, our disagreement is eliminated.
4) This would mean that there is some argument going on at the confrontation stage. Is
that possible?
5) Mohammed analyzes the passage as a simple non-mixed dispute: Cameron has a
standpoint and Brown expresses doubt about it through the use of an inconsistency retort.
But alternatively, and I think more realistically, it is Brown (the Government) who has a
standpoint and Cameron who has expressed doubt about it. If we view it this way, we can
make quite a bit of sense out of the excerpted passage.
Brown: Borrowing must be allowed [standpoint]
Cameron: ?? (Borrowing should be allowed) [expression of doubt]
Brown: [A number of arguments to remove Cameron’s doubt, including the
inconsistency retort.]
If we analyse the given textual example like this we have a more complete analysis of the
remarks made by Brown, but the inconsistency retort assumes a somewhat lesser role.
6) We may view the text yet another way. In the context of a debate in the British House
of Commons, the difference of opinion that is important to Brown is the one between his
Government and those who have doubts about his policy of allowing unfunded tax cuts.
Seen this way, Brown is not so much trying to make a response to Cameron as he is
trying to defend his government’s position in the British House of Commons. In response
to Cameron, he defends the Government’s position in what appears to be three ways.
Most importantly, he gives a supporting argument for his standpoint, namely that it will
help people and businesses through a difficult time caused by the international financial
crisis. This appears to be Brown’s main argument. Second, in saying that everyone agrees
that the economic downturn started in America, he implies that the change in policy is
necessitated by factors beyond his Government’s control and hence that the change in
policy is forced upon him. Third in importance, he minimizes Cameron’s objection to his
standpoint by pointing out that Cameron is inconsistent on the same question. On this
view the tu quoque charge is ancillary [secondary] to the main argument. It can be taken
in a number of ways all of which may be in play. It may have the rhetorical role of
reminding the members of the House (the audience) that at one time Cameron advocated
the very policy that the Government is now pursuing and that therefore Cameron’s
present objection to the policy needs some explanation on his part. Or, the charge of
5
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inconsistency may be intended to have the dialogical role of quieting Cameron’s
opposition and allowing Brown to concentrate on the positive arguments (see Whately’s
Elements of Logic). Or, finally, although Brown’s remark that Cameron has changed his
mind does leave the implication that he is inconsistent, the remark seems contextually to
be more closely associated with the one that follows it, namely, that Cameron would
deprive people of real help for business and families. So, rather than dwelling on
Cameron’s inconsistency, Brown uses it to to show his audience that Cameron’s present
position leads to undesirable results. Seen this way, the strategic manoeuvring in which
Brown engages is with the House and the public, Cameron’s views are but a pawn in the
game.
This last observation may be developed a little further. If we take two
propositions, A and not-A, we can either conjoin them and have an inconsistency, or we
can disjoin them and possibly forge a dilemma. A dilemma can also be used either to
express doubt about a standpoint or to give someone pause about their doubt. Looking at
the text we are given, we notice that Brown never actually makes an inconsistency retort;
what he says is that Cameron has changed his mind—given up an earlier view for a later
view—something that rationality often requires (consider what must happen at the
closing stage of a critical discussion). Mohammed interprets Brown’s remarks as an
inconsistency retort, but that may not be what was foremost in Brown’s mind since he
explicitly offers his hearers a choice though a disjunctive question: “Do we want to help
people through difficult times or do we want to take the advice […] [of the] […]
Conservative Government and do absolute ly nothing to help people in time of need?”
This question can be seen as the outcome of a constructive dilemma, which begins with a
disjunctive proposition of the form A and not-A.
EITHER borrowing should be allowed OR borrowing should not be allowed
IF borrowing is allowed, as Brown and his government are recommending, THEN
we will be able to help people through difficult times.
IF borrowing is not allowed, as it wasn’t during the earlier Conservative
Government, THEN hardships will fall on the people
Hence, EITHER we want to help people through difficult times OR we reject the
advice . . . [of the] . . . Conservative Government to do absolutely nothing to help
people in time of need
On this interpretation of what Brown says, he does not make an inconsistency retort at
all. What he does is he shows his audience that either Cameron must agree with him or
follow a route that would be very unpopular.
7) Suggestions for a subsequent version. More detailed, technical statements of what
‘inconsistency retorts,’ tu quoque, ‘no dispute’ and ‘critical testing’ are would be very
useful. (No-dispute disputes are like decafinated coffee, alcohol-free beer, marriages
without love—something is missing! It’s not really coffee, it’s not really beer, it’s not
really a marriage—it’s not really a dispute).
Link to paper
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